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Telecommunications have been seen by the EU, since the early 1990s, as an important 
aspect of the Information Society (European Commission 1994), though 
telecommunications policy-making and governance has tended to evolve separately from 
the more mainstream policy context set by the EU for the Information Society (and 
thematic variants thereof). Most research on EU policy for telecommunications has 
focused on the efforts made by the Union to create and maintain liberalised markets 
within Member States. Here, the EU’s well developed ‘hard’ single market legislation-
making and competition policy powers have been deployed to pursue classic ‘negative’ 
market-making integration, thus apparently a rather different set of circumstances than 
that pertaining in Information Society policy, which is underpinned by soft governance 
(see Harcourt 2008). However, less well emphasised in academic research has been the 
long-standing use by the EU in telecommunications of measures from the soft 
governance policy tool kit. Such usage has been developed quite strongly by the 
European Commission around efforts to ensure the transposition and implementation of a 
welter of directives agreed to by Member States since the early 1990s.  It has also to a 
lesser extent been manifest in legislative policy outcomes generated from negotiations 
that led to recent modifications of the telecommunications regulatory framework 
(Simpson 2011, forthcoming). Analysing the case of EU telecommunications from this 
angle allows experiences - and the lessons from them - to be drawn together and 
considered in the context of the EU’s pursuit of the Information Society through soft 
governance measures.  
 
This is the essential purpose of this paper. In so doing, it contributes to work which 
underlines the challenges of using effectively soft governance as an Information Society 
policy measure. The paper has two key findings. First, the EU’s employment of soft 
governance as a policy tool to stimulate effective transposition and implementation of 
agreed measures in telecommunications has been utilised alongside the threat (and use of) 
hard legal sanction. Though something of a complementary tool in this respect, evidence 
suggests that it has only been partially successfully. This is clearly illustrated, somewhat 
ironically, by the claims made by the European Commission in its most recent review of 
the telecommunications regulatory package, of ineffective compliance by Member States, 
despite many years of soft governance activity. An interesting feature is the prominent 
‘naming and shaming’ aspect of soft governance which has become, in effect, a victim of 
its own circumstance, since the longer it persists, the more evidence of its only partial 
effectiveness mounts. It is also the case that  such activity can sour relations between the 
European Commission and national regulatory authorities, with knock on implications for 
any attempts made by the former to increase its hard regulatory powers of enforcement. 
Relatedly, the second finding of the paper centres on the EU’s more limited drawing on 
soft governance as a product of decision-taking, highlighted by the example of the EU’s 
telecommunications regulatory remedies procedure. The precise outcome here has been 
‘hard’ legislation in the shape of a directive which stipulates soft governance measures. 
The paper argues that, in this case, there is evidence to reinforce existing work which 
suggests that soft governance has been utilised as a tool of piecemeal inter-institutional 
political compromise in controversial negotiating circumstances. This illustrates 
paradoxically, both a strong reluctance among Member States to enhance the European 
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Commission’s hard supranational power yet a recognition of its continuing importance in 
ensuring the effective harmonisation of telecommunications across the EU. 
 
Overall, the paper argues that soft governance in telecommunications has been used as a 
‘second best’ policy tool. If used in this way, the chances of it delivering its potential for 
common purpose, innovativeness and efficacy in the service of the public interest at EU 
level is considerably undermined. Telecommunications, though frequently cited by the 
EU as a core aspect of the Information Society, adds further weight to the argument that 
soft governance will struggle to deliver the goals of the Information Society, broadly 
defined. The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief synopsis of the 
features of the EU’s policy initiative in the Information Society begun in the early 1990s. 
Following this, the paper explores some of the findings of the burgeoning literature on 
soft governance in respect of its likely explanatory power for policy developments in 
telecommunications and the Information Society. The subsequent two sections of the 
paper explore evidence on the use of soft governance in the two key instances of the 
implementation of the telecommunications regulatory framework and the 2009 agreement 
on a revised procedure for the consideration of regulatory remedies in 
telecommunications. The final section of the paper comments briefly on the significance 
of soft governance in telecommunications, and by extension, the Information Society 
policy initiative of the EU. 
 
THE EU, SOFT GOVERNANCE AND THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 
The EU’s early engagement with the policy area of the Information Society stretches 
back to the beginning of the 1990s and provides an important insight into why this policy 
area emerged as a case in which soft governance – specifically the Open Method of 
Coordination (Hodson and Maher 2001) – became prominent. The increasing 
significance of Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) in social and 
economic life from the 1960s led to a series of arguments, emanating principally from 
academia, around its distinctiveness and, more questionably, its potentially discontinuous 
nature. Advocates of the ‘post-industrial’ society highlighted the increasing importance 
of information in technological and economic life (Bell 1974). Emphasis was placed on 
the emergence of a new service economy populated by workers with high levels of 
knowledge and skills. Whilst such a development promised economic growth, it also 
risked the creation of social divisions (Touraine 1974). Post-industrialism would thus 
give rise to the Information Society (Toffler 1980; Masuda 1983). More recently, 
concerns about the technological determinism in these early accounts led to the 
postulation of alternatives with emphasis on social relations, such as Informationalism 
(Castells 1996), as well very strong criticisms of the idea of the Information Society as 
discontinuous (see May 2002; Schiller 2007). 
 
The ideas around the Information Society present an important example of the adoption 
of concepts developed about ICT in the academic world, into political and policy-making 
environments (Cawood and Simpson 2000). The EU became aware of the strategic 
technological and economic significance of IT and telecommunications through the 
1980s, though tended to focus, for the most part, on the task of developing cross-national, 
often  public-private, research and development partnerships as part of successive phases 
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of its Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development. However, in 
the early 1990s, the EU began to articulate its ICT policies much more broadly in terms 
of the Information Society, adopting many of the ideas that had been developed in 
academia to that point.  
 
In 1993, the then EU President Jacques Delors made a particular point of emphasising the 
importance of the Information Society in the EU’s pursuit of future employment growth 
and economic prosperity (European Commission 1993). The Information Society as a 
policy idea proved strategically useful for the EU, particularly the European Commission 
and specifically its Information Society and Media Directorate. It was portrayed as a 
much more over-arching and comprehensive policy idea than specific ‘sub-sectoral’ 
initiatives in IT, telecommunications or the audiovisual fields. The Information Society 
policy area thus suggested that the EU was in the process of taking action in a new deeply 
important arena. The EU also developed its Information Society policy flexibly, making 
possible that a wide number of policy constituencies might identify with it. Thus, for 
example, the 1994 Bangemann Report, Europe and the Global Information Society, 
drawn up for the most part by the industrial elites of Europe’s ICT companies and the 
Commission, viewed the Information Society from a strong technological and industrial 
perspective. Here, emphasis was placed on upgrading communication network 
infrastructure and the speedy creation of new ICT services. This would deliver social and 
economic prosperity, though would be primarily private sector driven and required the 
complete liberalisation of telecommunications infrastructures across the EU by 
governments to facilitate its development (European Commission 1994). The idea of the 
EU Information Society was not simply a cloak for propounding ICT industrial policy, 
however. As something of a repost, the part of the European Commission responsible for 
employment, economic and social affairs articulated a more cautionary approach than the 
thinly veiled economic determinism of the Bangemann Report. It created its owned social 
constituencies-informed High Level Group on the Information Society which highlighted 
concerns about the creation of a digital divide and asked the EU to take policy action to 
counteract this possibility, urging ‘more effective instruments to support demand-led 
regional policies for those areas/regions with a development shortfall where the potential 
benefits of technology are unlikely to filter through’ (European Commission 1997).  
 
This milieu of opinion undoubtedly contributed to the shape which a raft of EU 
Information Society policies have taken since the mid-1990s, with themed versions 
successively known as the EU Information Society Action Plan, eEurope, i2010, and the 
recently launched Digital Agenda (European Commission 2010). Throughout, the 
European Commission has emphasised the fundamental significance of the initiatives. 
For example, it quite dramatically described its eEurope proposals as a “political 
initiative…not just about technology…[but affecting]…everyone, everywhere” 
(European Commission 1999: 4-5). Over a more than 15 year period, a relatively stable 
series of themes  - albeit given fresh packaging in successive programmes – has been in 
evidence. For example, in 1994, the EU launched an Action Plan, containing a number of 
modest measures of an economic and social bent which was affirmed two years later by 
the Commission’s proposal to focus on the four key areas of developing appropriate 
market and regulatory conditions; investment in research on ICT; effective targeting of 
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regional aid money to Information Society related issues in respect of public services; 
and an exploration of global ICT trade matters as they would affect Europe (European 
Commission 1996; European Council of Ministers 1996). Proposals for the eEurope 
initiative focused on providing universal access to digital services for individuals, schools 
and businesses; encouraging digital literacy; and promoting consumer trust, social 
cohesion and inclusiveness yet at the same time specified measures to create e-
commerce, smart card technology and a capital market for European high technology 
small and medium sized enterprises (European Commission 1999).  
 
It is interesting to note the Commission’s declaration in putting forward the Information 
Society programme in 1996 that "the multi-faceted nature of the Information Society 
implies a need for greater policy co-ordination between the various Community policies 
and between the Community's different instruments and funding mechanisms" (p5). This 
goal merely served to point up the difficulty of putting together a measurably coherent 
policy programme in such a diffuse and unwieldy policy area. In part as a consequence, 
the EU chose to utilise soft governance measures to develop the ‘mainstream’ 
programmes of its Information Society policies. Academic analysis of these to date has 
underlined the limitations of such an endeavour. Lodge (2007) finds a lack of relationship 
between performance indicators and objectives, with the latter being very broad in nature. 
A related issue is a looseness of the Information Society subject field which tended to 
grow and incorporate new areas, some of which related to more traditional policy 
measures, and which made the task of appropriate integration of policy measures very 
difficult. Relatedly, Lodge is sceptical about the reporting of achievements under the 
Information Society banner, many of which appeared to be initiatives outside the OMC 
process set by the EU for the Information Society. Overall, ‘standards had no directing 
capacity, information gathering offered only very little truly comparative information to 
encourage “benchmarking” or “learning with others” and voluntary adjustment pressures 
seemed hardly present’ (Lodge 2007: 358). 
 
 
SOFT GOVERNANCE AND THE EU 
The EU has developed into an elaborate system of legislation-making and regulatory 
governance in which non-hierarchical or soft governance has come to play a prominent 
role. The use of soft governance intensified after the launch of the EU’s Lisbon Agenda 
(2000) which laid the ground for the introduction of the Open Method of Coordination 
(OMC) in which policy goals would be pursued and developed in selected policy areas 
through the use of a range of measures such as guidelines, timetables, benchmarks, 
procedures for the definition and sharing of best practice, implementation monitoring - 
including so-called ‘naming and shaming’-, and peer review (Lodge 2007), all 
underpinned by voluntarism. The EU has since its inception struggled with the problems 
of creating an agreeably effective system of governance and the use of soft governance 
can be seen as an attempt to deal with familiar, persistent problems in an innovative 
fashion. Throughout, a key issue has been a tension between the pursuit of EU policy 
through supranational means, on the one hand, and intergovernmental means, on the 
other. A central concern is the extent to which the use of soft governance enhances the 
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policy convergence capacity (Citi and Rhodes 2007) of the EU and its Member States in 
selected policy domains.  
 
Historically, EU institutions and Member States have sought to achieve progress through 
employing the directive as a hard, hierarchical legal measure whose requirement to be 
transposed into national law provided, in many cases, enough scope for flexibility to 
achieve progress. However, inevitably, even the directive’s flexibility has not been 
enough to remove the tendency for Member States to balk at legislative measures whose 
consequences they consider to be excessively supranational in nature. The corollary is 
that such measures have often been perceived as restricting too much the degrees of 
freedom for manoeuvre at the national level. Beyond that, even if agreed to, the 
directive’s flexibility in transposition has often led to a compliance problem in the 
implementation phase. Associated with this, and often exacerbating it, is the possibility of 
weakness in precision in the drafting of directives, particularly in technical areas, such as 
telecommunications, which would benefit from clarification and further development 
through time. This might not necessarily be of the kind or extent to require wholesale re-
writing of the legislation and might be achievable through policy learning characteristic 
of soft governance environments. The implementation problem, if widespread and 
persistent enough, can potentially lead to de facto policy failure for the EU, unless the 
European Commission is prepared to utilise the European Court of Justice to take so-
called ‘implementation laggards’ to task. Such hard legal action is likely to be effective 
eventually, though can be time-consuming, resource-intensive and politically unpopular. 
If implementation non-compliance is quite widespread, it can also create a breadth of 
negativity likely to prove damaging to future policy initiatives with the goal of further 
Europeanisation at their core. Instead, the use of soft governance measures, such as 
benchmarking, peer review and ‘naming and shaming’, have been posited as possible 
alternative solutions. 
 
Certain EU policy areas are often rather unwieldy in nature. This can develop to be the 
case in times of change and uncertainty, often underpinned by significant technological 
turbulence and sectoral reorganisation as has occurred across recent decades in 
information and communications based industries. Such situations can lead to policy 
opportunities for the EU in terms of becoming involved in new domains, as was the case 
in telecommunications and the Information Society, but also to problems of coordination 
as new definitions of products, services and markets emerge and new indicators of 
sectoral growth are sought and developed. Policy range, complexity and uncertainty can 
lead to a tendency, therefore, for policy-making bodies keen to develop competence in 
new areas, to seek out flexible, voluntary measures of the kind epitomised by soft 
governance, which provide the capacity for policy learning as well as policy 
coordination. As shown in the case of the Information Society, these can also, however, 
be fraught with weaknesses. 
 
Irrespective of the potential motivations behind the use of soft governance, some of 
which, ironically, have been employed with the aim of curbing its influence, the 
European Commission tends to be a key EU institutional actor in the range of processes 
around the pursuit of soft governance. It has played a role as gatherer of information 
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crucial in exercises involving peer review and bench-marking. However, it also plays an 
important role in processing information and reporting on the results of its analysis. This 
has manifested itself at key junctures in the life of wide-ranging programmes 
underpinned by the Open Method of Coordination, notably the Information Society, as 
well as, in the case of telecommunications, through a series of annual reports on the 
implementation of the EU telecommunications regulatory package (see below).  
 
The Commission’s role in soft governance processes sheds light on a possible distinction 
between its hard, legally mandated power, on the one hand, and, on the other, power that 
it could develop through the scope of persuasion exercisable through soft governance. 
This might be achievable through the Commission’s sheer presence in the resource 
intensive activities around making soft governance work in areas like the Information 
Society and telecommunications. In the latter case, this has come to involve regular and 
close interaction with regulatory actors, both state and independent-public, at the national 
level which tend to retain material power in soft governance situations. In this way, the 
use of soft governance by Member States may provide evidence of the changing, adaptive 
nature of the Commission’s pursuit of influence. At key junctures in telecommunications, 
notably in respect of activity around the negotiation process among Member States which 
is based on its proposals, evidence persists of its willingness to exercise policy 
entrepreneurial activities of a controversial nature. Here the Commission can aim to 
influence decision-making towards – but also away from – the pursuit of soft governance. 
The Commission is also displaying evidence of strategies to cultivate its influence in 
phases of the policy process beyond policy formation and decision taking which are 
driven by soft governance. Certainly, there is at least enough to suggest its potential for 
more intensive activity in this respect. 
 
An interesting development in regulatory governance at EU level has been the use of hard 
and soft governance measures in tandem (Citi and Rhodes 2007). This has tended to 
involve the creation of a piece of hard legislation, usually in the form of a directive, some 
of whose specific measures stipulate what might be termed ‘operational soft governance’. 
A key example in the broad area of the Information Society was the EU’s Directive on 
Electronic Commerce (European Parliament and Council 2000) which addressed so-
called information society services whose definition encompassed any service or service 
related activity carried out electronically at a distance. In essence, as a piece of hard 
legislation, the directive laid out a series of legal provisions whose aim was to ensure that 
the Single European Market in e-commerce was created. However, the functioning of the 
specific measures of the directive was much more loosely specified and reflected many of 
the characteristics of soft governance. For example, in respect of information 
requirements to be placed on e-commerce providers, the Directive mandated minimum 
requirements, on the one hand, yet on the other instructed Member States merely to 
encourage self-regulatory bodies of e-commerce providers to develop codes of conduct 
regarding information to be provided to e-commerce customers. The creation of such 
codes of conduct was also merely encouraged in respect of the specifications of e-
contracts and the liability of intermediary e-commerce service providers and the 
participation of consumer bodies in drawing up and reviewing the enforcement of such 




Taking this kind of hybrid approach was useful to the EU for a number of reasons. First, 
around the time of the directive, there was considerable uncertainty about the evolution of 
the e-commerce within the information society. The EU wished to ensure that it did not 
put in place any regulatory conditions that might hamper European firms in the evolving 
global marketplace of the Internet. Second, because of the rapidly evolving nature of 
Internet technology, the EU was keen to ensure that it did not put in place measures 
which would have to be reversed in the short-to-medium term as a result of new 
technology-based services for which existing arrangements might prove something of a 
regulatory straightjacket. As a corollary, and thirdly, taking such an approach ensured 
that the policy framework for the regulation of commercial activities conducted through 
the Internet would be seen as distinct from other better established areas of electronic 
communications regulation, notably telecommunications but also broadcasting. 
Historically, these areas had, at key moments highlighted the difficulty of creating 
effective Europeanisation of policy. Because of the convergent nature of the Internet and 
Information and Communications Technologies, it was certainly possible to view the 
development of e-commerce through a telecommunications - and to a lesser extent an 
audiovisual - policy lens, something which the EU studiously avoided doing. The 
Directive on E-Commerce provided a strong indicator that the EU wished to regulate the 
Internet, and Internet commerce in particular, in as light touch a fashion, as possible, 
something which was in step with broader regulatory thinking at the global institutional 
level (Christou and Simpson 2007). 
 
 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, THE EU AND SOFT GOVERNANCE – 
TRANSPOSITION AND IMPLEMENTATION 
The creation of a regulatory framework for telecommunications at EU level pre-dates the 
development of the Information Society agenda, having its roots in a number of market 
liberalising and harmonising directives of the late 1980s-early 1990s. Around the time 
that the EU was beginning to articulate a policy stance on the Information Society, it was 
also pursuing vigorously an agreement among Member States on the liberalisation of 
telecommunications services. The telecommunications liberalisation project became 
linked politically to the pursuit of the Information Society through the Bangemann Report 
which urged Member States to put in place measures to liberalise telecommunications 
infrastructures across the EU in complement to the agreement which they had reached in 
1993 on comprehensive telecommunications services liberalisation (European Council of 
Ministers 1993. Whilst this duly transpired in 1994 (European Council of Ministers 
1994), it is unlikely that the launch of the EU’s Information Society agenda was the key 
factor in the agreement made by Member States.  
 
Since the point of these landmark agreements which pledged Member States to take the 
necessary measures to liberalise and harmonise their telecommunications markets, a 
battery of hard legislation has been developed, mostly in the form of directives, with the 
purpose of the creating a Single European Market in telecommunications. The 
telecommunications regulatory package has been developed and refined through the last 
20 years and now takes the form of the Electronic Communications Regulatory 
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Framework (ECRF), the latest legislative revisions to which should take effect in 
Member States through 2011. 
 
A notable feature of the development of EU telecommunications policy has been the 
consistently problematic transposition and implementation of agreed hard legislation. 
Whilst, not unusual per se, telecommunications is noteworthy for the way in which the 
EU, through the activities of the European Commission, has employed soft governance 
measures as a means of trying to ensure more effective transposition and implementation. 
This has two important implications. First, it underscores the problematic nature of the 
use of hard legislation in the effective creation of policy convergence among EU Member 
States. Whilst hard legislation can secure agreement to take action, it does not by any 
means guarantee that the necessary action will occur. Second, the use of soft governance 
measures by the EU in this aspect of telecommunications policy is also indicative of the 
Commission’s search for a complementary and/or alternative means to taking Member 
States to the European Court of Justice to secure compliance.  Here, there is strong 
evidence that the EU has employed soft governance measures in conjunction with the 
hard governance mechanism entailed in the functioning of the European Court of Justice. 
 
It is interesting to note that the EU’s use of soft governance in the transposition and 
implementation aspects of telecommunications has its origins in the late 1990s, thereby 
commencing before the 2000 Lisbon Agreement and the adoption of the OMC in 
Information Society policy. Here, strong evidence of the use of soft governance is to be 
found in a series of 15 implementation reports published since 1997. The European 
Commission has developed into the key institutional player in respect of using soft 
governance measures in this aspect of telecommunications policy. From the outset, it 
‘pulled no punches’ in citing concerns about Member States’ failure to transpose 
legislation notably in France, Belgium, Greece, Ireland and Portugal (Humphreys and 
Simpson 2005: 69-71). In tandem with this ‘naming and shaming tactic’, the Commission 
has also shown itself willing to pursue hard legal measures through launching 
infringement proceedings against Member States, such as Spain in 1997 for its failure at 
the time to open up telecommunications infrastructures to competition. Such a set of 
tactics continued after the modification of the 1998 telecommunications regulatory 
package to create the ECRF, with Belgium, Germany, Greece, France, Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands having been subject to infringement proceedings in respect of ineffective 
transposition of legislation.  
 
Throughout the last decade, the Commission has regularly and continuously highlighted 
failures of Member States to transpose and implement legislation, a particular focus being 
the accession states from central Europe. This process has often involved it being highly 
critical of National Regulatory Authorities, which in telecommunications have tended to 
play a key role in ensuring effective regulation commensurate with the specifications of 
legislation  in place at the national level. Here, in 2008, for example, the Commission 
was notably critical about the time taken to resolve regulatory disputes, highlighting 




In its latest report, the Commission continued to comment critically on progress in 
Member States, highlighting general areas of deficiency and ‘name and shaming’ 
underperforming Member States. It also linked persistent non-compliance of certain 
Member States with its taking of legal proceedings against them. In general terms, the 
Commission reported quite forthrightly that ‘consumers and businesses are still faced 
with 27 different markets and are thus not able to take advantage of the economic 
potential of a single market’. Specifically highlighted problems were instances of (lack 
of) independence and ineffectiveness in National Regulatory Authorities, differences in 
wholesale and retail prices for services and ‘the failure to apply remedies in a consistent, 
timely, transparent and predictable manner’. NRAs were also criticised for an inability to 
respond effectively to new developments in communications technologies and markets 
(European Commission 2010: 1). The Commission openly criticised Latvia, Lithuania 
and Romania noting that legal proceedings had been taken in respect of the structural 
separation of regulatory and operator ownership and control functions in their territories. 
Belgium and Luxembourg were criticised for producing ‘limited results’ in respect of 
carrying out regulatory reviews and putting in place regulatory remedies to address ‘key 
bottlenecks’ (European Commission 2010: 6). Italy, Germany, Belgium  and 
Luxembourg were criticised for not acting quickly enough in respect of providing 
reference offers in the broadband market (specifically in broadband lines provision), thus 
potentially retarding the development of competition. In respect of universal service 
obligations, the Commission highlighted the existence of infringement proceedings for 
unsatisfactory implementation against Belgium, Portugal and Spain and noted its ongoing 
scrutiny of the Danish universal funding mechanism (European Commission 2010). 
 
 A key advantage of using soft governance to ensure effective compliance is its use of 
persuasion to effect voluntary compliance with legally mandated requirements. However, 
despite the extensive use of soft governance mechanisms with this purpose in mind, the 
EU has not been able to secure the necessary degree of implementation without recourse 
to the European Court of Justice. This provides a strong indication of the limitations of 
soft governance. However, the quite extensive exercises entailed in soft governance 
processes do have potential advantages when used in conjunction with the formal 
mechanism of the ECJ. First, information gathering and processing has proved useful for 
the European Commission in gaining a picture of the extent of implementation and thus 
in putting together its case. Second, the exercises require relatively close liaison and 
relationship cultivation with the range of National Regulatory Authorities in 
telecommunications, though the evidence above points also to strong potential for a 
fractious relationship to develop here. Counterbalancing these considerations, however, is 
the concern that in using the soft governance mechanisms as it has done in respect of the 
transposition and implementation phase of the telecommunications regulatory 
framework, the Commission must tread a careful line between promoting the 
development of the framework as a success on the whole and, by contrast, highlighting its 
persistent deficiencies.  
 
The above consideration aside, it was nevertheless clear that, at the commencement of the 
most recent review of telecommunications launched in 2006, the Commission considered 
there to be a lot more progress to be made in order to create a harmonised set of 
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telecommunications markets across Member States. In particular, it complained about the 
unacceptable and persistent lack of regulatory consistency across the EU’s national 
telecommunications markets. This led to a series of proposals for revisions to the ECRF, 
several of which were particularly contentious. Among these, arguably the most 
controversial related to regulatory remedies, to which the paper now turns, since this 
matter provides an example of a set of circumstances in which the EU deployed soft 
governance measures in the process of policy decision taking. 
 
 
EU TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND SOFT GOVERNANCE AS A TOOL FOR 
POLITICAL DECISION-TAKING  
The issue of creating an appropriate system for regulatory remedies sits at the heart of the 
pursuit of a harmonised set of telecommunications markets across the EU. Whilst a 
framework of hard legislation allowed the EU to put in place the parameters of a 
Europeanised system of telecommunications governance, it is important to note that this 
arrangement was far from completely supranational. Instead, EU telecommunications 
involves a balance between power exercisable at both the EU institutional and national 
levels (Thatcher 2001). In day to day operational terms, as might be expected, 
considerably more responsibility for the effective functioning of telecommunications 
markets resides nationally. Here, the decisions taken by National Regulatory Authorities 
are crucial and have proven particularly problematic for the European Commission in its 
ongoing analysis of the functioning of the regulatory framework after the implementation 
of  necessary legislation. As a result, the Commission has for at least a decade aimed to 
secure what it considers to be a minimum necessary shift of power from the national to 
the European level to ameliorate the identified problems. This has more often than not 
implied an increase in its own hard legal responsibilities and power, something which has 
generated considerable controversy and resistance throughout.  
 
In the review process that led to the creation of the ECRF in 2002, the Commission 
proposed  -  and perhaps unexpectedly was able to secure for itself - hard veto power over 
decisions taken by NRAs in the two key areas of telecommunications market definition 
and the designation of the existence of Significant Market Power in specified 
telecommunications markets (European Parliament and Council 2002). These two matters 
were vitally important in the evolution of liberalised competitive telecommunications 
across the EU. As telecommunications moved from former monopoly state ownership to 
competition-based markets, it was considered important to make a clear differentiation 
for competition purposes between a range of activities involved in the provision of 
telecommunications services. Equally, the historically dominant position of the former 
state owned telecommunications incumbents meant that measures were necessary to 
highlight the persistence of market share domination by these concerns in new markets 
characterised by regulated competition. However, designation of markets and 
determination of the existence or otherwise of unacceptable market power were only part 
of the task of creating harmonised, effectively functioning telecommunications markets 




Already clearly established as its preferred strategy in terms of developing necessary 
market modifying measures, in the 2006 review of the ECRF the Commission proposed 
further extension of its veto powers, under the so-called ‘Article 7 procedure’ of the 2002 
Framework directive to the field of regulatory remedies proposed by Member State 
NRAs.  In justifying its call, the Commission expressed strong criticism about what it 
saw as a series of differing decisions having being taken regularly by NRAs in similar 
situations, as well as regulatory remedies which were of poor quality in terms of their 
precision, detail and timeliness (European Commission 2006). This had proven to be the 
case in spite of the existence, since 2002, of the European Regulators Group (now known 
as the Body of European Regulators in Electronic Communications) composed of EU 
NRAs which met as an epistemic gathering to exchange best regulatory practice in very 
much a soft governance scenario. In discussing potential ways forward in respect of the 
persistence of the operational regulatory problems it highlighted, the Commission noted 
that developing some kind of soft governance framework to deal with regulatory 
remedies involving ‘voluntary coordination without a transfer of power to a central 
authority’ (European Commission 2007: 77), though possible, would be far from optimal.  
 
As the debate on creating a regulatory remedies procedure as part of the revision to the 
ECRF continued apace through 2007-08, it became clear that there was particularly 
strong opposition to extending the Commission’s veto rights from NRAs, which would 
have witnessed a direct diminution of their regulatory power as a consequence. 
Opposition was also expressed among certain MEPs, as well as national Member States, 
notably Germany, which had at the time been embroiled in a dispute with the 
Commission over a proposal to give Deutsche Telekom a ‘regulatory holiday’ in return 
for network upgrade investments (see Mallinder 2006; EurActiv.com: 14.11.07). By 
contrast, there was some support for the Commission’s proposal from newer 
telecommunications service providers (Humphreys 2008).  
 
The denouement of the negotiations on regulatory remedies provides an important 
example of the use by Member States and the European Parliament of soft governance 
measures to attempt to resolve a difference of opinion with the Commission. Here, the 
latter was given a greater say in the process of regulatory remedies, though no substantive 
increase in its hard power in the form of the veto it had asked for. Nevertheless, given the 
lack of any real support for a Commission veto on remedies from Member States and the 
European Parliament - which could have resulted in no further action on remedies at all -  
the outcome of the negotiations cannot simply be explained as a straightforward rejection 
of the Commission’s proposals. Rather, the precise specifications of the new remedies 
procedure can be viewed as an indication of the perceived importance of the Commission 
as a regulatory actor in European telecommunications. They also provide evidence of the 
willingness of Member States to invest faith in soft governance processes as a way of 
ameliorating a widely recognised problem in the face of reluctance to transfer further 
hard regulatory power to the Commission.  Here, the new procedure written into a revised 
(hard legal) Framework directive effectively allows the Commission merely to express its 
disagreement with a proposed NRA regulatory remedy, resulting in a short period of 
deliberation between the Commission, the NRA in question and BEREC which replaced 
the ERG as part of the modifications to the ECRF. If no agreement can be reached, the 
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new procedure gives the Commission the opportunity to issue a Recommendation 
specifying its requirements in the matter for the NRA, though ultimately adoption of 
these is voluntary (European Parliament and Council 2009).  
 
 
CONCLUSION   
The evidence in this paper on the specific uses of soft governance in EU 
telecommunications points strongly to its limited potential to contribute to the realisation 
of the policy goals of the Information Society, more broadly.  Whilst EU Information 
Society policy is a broad umbrella-like policy field employing the soft governance Open 
Method of Coordination, telecommunications is for the most part more ‘traditional’, in 
the main delivered through a battery hard legislation with compulsory stipulations of a 
harmonising and liberalising bent. However, as the hard policy framework for 
telecommunications was put in place, so too emerged evidence of the limitations of  these 
negative integration measures, in terms of transposition and implementation. Here, the 
European Commission has put in place a broad and resource burdensome system in 
which hard and soft governance are used in order to secure the effective implementation 
of the telecommunications regulatory package agreed to by Member States. Making a 
precise judgement on the success of soft governance in this context is difficult. On the 
one hand, there is little doubt that the process of implementation has proceeded smoothly 
for the most part: this is to be expected for legislation which has negotiated the often 
tricky and protracted EU decision making process. The information gathering and 
performance monitoring and reporting activities of the European Commission are 
undoubtedly useful to the latter as it seeks to influence the course of telecommunications 
policy development. It also links the Commission more closely with NRAs. However, 
evidence suggests that the sometimes controversial nature of this process has led to a 
strong desire among NRAs to ensure where possible that the Commission’s power is not 
strengthened. Further, it is unlikely to be the case that the soft governance measures put 
in place by the Commission would be successful without the hard legal recourse to the 
European Court of Justice for non-compliance. Equally, the ongoing struggle between the 
European Commission and Member States over implementation is indicative of the fact 
that both the soft and hard governance measures around the processes of implementation 
are problematic. 
 
Rather differently, the use of soft governance in EU telecommunications in the recent 
consideration of regulatory remedies provides evidence of soft governance as something 
of a ‘second best’ tool of political compromise. As noted above, the agreement of what is 
a convoluted modified remedies procedure is interesting in that it illustrates succinctly 
how  important an actor the European Commission has become in telecommunications, 
yet at the same time the continued strong reticence from Member states to see any 
extension of hard veto power to the Commission. Certainly, giving the Commission a 
greater say in the remedies procedure through a potential increase in its soft governance 
influence is regarded as ‘second best’ from the Commission’s own perspective, though a 
decision which, like many in the history of telecommunications, it has had to go along 
with. In telecommunications, Member States proved more willing to give the 
Commission hard veto power in respect of the more low volume, quantifiably calculable 
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matters of market definition and Significant Market Power. The work on remedies is 
likely to be higher volume, arguably more contentious and something where national 
variety is likely to be a key factor, all of which mitigated against the Commission’s 
chances of securing hard veto power over it. The Commission has continued to complain 
post the agreement, based on evidence gathered from, among others, the UK, Sweden, 
Greece, Poland and Portugal, that the time and resource requirements attached to 
regulatory appeals are having a detrimental effect on the workload of regulators. It was 
openly critical of the performance of Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg noting that 
‘lack of clarity in remedies further delays their take up and also tends to provoke disputes 
which further consume regulators’ resources’ (European Commission 2010: 6). An 
interesting future line of research will be the ways in which the Commission chooses to 
cultivate the potential for soft power in the new procedure. The latter gives it scope for 
increasing the loudness of its complaints, though the extent to which this will constitute 
anything other than noise over substance remains to be seen (Simpson 2011).  
 
However, the Commission has also given an indication that its well-developed powers of 
interpreting legislation in its favour politically may become manifest if the soft 
governance arrangements of the new remedies procedure are seen to be ineffective. Here, 
it appears to have interpreted Article 19 of the revised Framework directive as leaving 
open the possibility for it in the future to take direct action to eradicate instances of long 
term regulatory divergence at the national level, something which the outgoing 
Commissioner for Information Society and Media, Viviane Reding, has signalled its 
intention to use. However, to avoid this kind of controversy and potential acrimony 
between the EU and national level in the future, the soft governance arrangements in the 
remedies procedure need to address the inevitably high demands on those that will 
implement them. They should not, therefore, be considered as a second best or fallback 
option when hard governance measures prove inadequate or are impossible to agree at 
EU level, as seems to have been the case. This is particularly important in respect of the 
kind of behaviour modification goals which underpin the EU’s adoption of soft 
governance in the remedies procedure which to be achieved are likely to require a strong 
degree of interaction intensity (Lodge 2007) of a positive kind between the Commission 
and NRAs. There is evidence that this relationship has been problematic to date, 
however. Overall, the case of the limited use of soft governance in telecommunications 
highlighted in this paper does not suggest that it is a strong or effective route to the 
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